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ABSTRACT. International trade and the free movement of people are inevitably 
followed by legal disputes. Such litigants require an efficient and predictable dispute 
resolution mechanism capable of handling cases between diverse nationals. An 
essential part of such mechanism is a clearly defined process of judgment 
enforcement across national boundaries. In the past several decades, the European 
Union (“EU”) has necessarily addressed judgment enforcement across the 
boundaries of its member nations (“Member States”). Citizens of the EU need to 
prosecute and defend their legal rights in their home and in other EU member states. 
Presently, the EU is, again, considering such issues and is poised to make some 
changes in this area. As with past EU legislation regarding judgment recognition and 
enforcement, the proposed changes are intended to promote the growth of the 
European economy by encouraging and furthering cross-border trade and the free 
movement of people. This paper presents the following, (1) a brief introduction to 
civil and commercial judgment recognition and enforcement in the EU, (2) the 
current status of judgment enforcement as exemplified in significant case law, (3) 
the deficiencies of current EU judgment enforcement Brussels Is, and finally, (3) the 
proposed changes to such Brussels I currently. 
 
Keywords: European Community, Brussels I 44/2001, judgment, recognition, 
                   enforcement, exequatur proceedings 
 
 
Introduction 
 
International trade and the free movement of people are inevitably followed 
by legal disputes. Such litigants require an efficient and predictable dispute 
resolution mechanism capable of handling cases between diverse nationals.  
An essential part of such mechanism is a clearly defined process of 
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judgment enforcement across national boundaries. In the past several 
decades, the European Union (“EU”) has necessarily addressed judgment 
enforcement across the boundaries of member nations (“Member States”).  
Citizens of the EU need to prosecute and defend their legal rights in their 
home and in other EU member states. Presently, the EU is, again, 
considering such issues and is poised to make some changes in this area.  
As with past EU legislation regarding judgment recognition and 
enforcement, the proposed changes are intended to promote the growth of 
the European economy by encouraging and furthering cross-border trade 
and the free movement of people.  This paper presents the following, (1) a 
brief introduction to civil and commercial judgment recognition and 
enforcement in the EU, (2) the current status of judgment enforcement as 
exemplified in significant case law, (3) the deficiencies of current EU 
judgment enforcement Brussels Is, and finally, (3) the proposed changes to 
such Brussels I currently. 
 
1. Cross-Border Civil Judgment Enforcement in the EU 
 
The 1968 Brussels Convention (“Brussels”) was the first comprehensive 
legislation dealing with, among other things, the enforcement of judgments 
in the EU.1 As articulated in its preamble, Brussels’ ultimate goal was to 
promote economic growth within the Union and harmonize the rules for 
cross-border enforcement of civil judgments: 
 
Desiring to implement the provisions of Article 220 of that 
Treaty2 by virtue of which they undertook to secure the 
simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals; 
Anxious to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of 
persons therein established; Considering that it is necessary for 
this purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of their 
courts, to facilitate recognition and to introduce an expeditious 
procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, authentic 
instruments and court settlements.3 
 
Brussels applied to civil or commercial matters (excluding matters related to 
family law, wills, bankruptcy, insolvency, social security or arbitration).4  It 
addressed the mutual dependent subjects of jurisdictional and judgment 
enforcement. On December 22, 2000, the European Council adopted 
Regulation No. 44/2001 (“Brussels I”), which went into effect in March of 
2002, effectively replacing Brussels and becoming the keystone of EU 
procedural law.5 Most of the concepts included in Brussels I merely 
reproduce the rules already in force its predecessor. As stated in its 
 11
preamble, the principal aims of Brussels I, which applies to all member 
states (except Denmark6), remain those of Brussels, “[c]ertain differences 
between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments 
hamper the sound operation of the internal market.  Provisions to unify the 
rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to 
simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and simple recognition and 
enforcement of judgments from Member States bound by this Brussels I are 
essential.”7  
Brussels I keeps the framework of the Brussels (but introduces a number 
of amendments, which are outside the scope of this article). As with 
Brussels, Brussels I applies to all civil and commercial matters only.8 The 
substantive areas of Brussels I benign with Chapter II, which addresses 
personal jurisdiction, and sets forth the basic rule, as found in Brussels) that 
an individual is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which 
the individual is domiciled, regardless of that individual’s nationality.9  The 
real reach of the Brussels I over personal jurisdiction can especially be 
appreciated in Section 2, Article 5 of the Brussels I entitled “Special 
Jurisdiction.” Under this Article, the basic rule stays the same as Brussels, 
but for all obligations in the sale of movable goods and in the provision of 
services, the place of performance is the place were the goods have been 
delivered or the services have been provided.10 As for subject matter 
jurisdiction, Brussels I covers, generally, all contract matters, tort matters, 
claims for restitution under limited circumstances, disputes arising out of 
the operation of a branch, agency or other establishment, disputes in 
connection with a settler, trustee or beneficiary of a trust and for claims 
regarding payment of remuneration where cargo or freight has been secured 
for payment.11   
Recognition and enforcement of judgments are addressed in Chapter III 
of Brussels I.  Under Article 32 “[j]udgment means any judgment given by 
a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, 
including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the 
determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court.” Article 33 
plainly and clearly reiterates the underlying principle of Brussels, “a 
judgment given in a Member State shall be recognized in the other 
Members States without any special procedure being required.”   
 
Article 34 creates exceptions to Article 33 and its automatic 
recognition, it states that judgments will not be recognized, “1. 
If such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought; 2. Where is was 
given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served 
with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an 
equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to 
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enable him to arrange for his defense, unless the defendant 
failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when 
it was possible for him to do so; 3. If it is irreconcilable with a 
judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought; 4. If is 
irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member 
State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties, providing that the earlier judgment 
fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member 
States addressed.12 
 
The Brussels I recognizes the importance of respecting the jurisdiction of 
the original court of judgment. With respect to any questions arising over 
jurisdiction in the original court, the Brussels I defers all questions of fact to 
that original issuing court.13 The respect afforded the original court on 
questions of fact is reinforced in Article 36, which states: “Under no 
circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.” If 
an appeal is pending, the court in which enforcement is sought my stay the 
proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.14   
Section 2 of Chapter III address judgment enforcement, the heart of the 
issue.  Article 38 allows for the enforceability of judgments cross-border.  
The judgment is enforceable when an interested party makes application to 
the proper authority in the other Member State for a declaration that the 
judgment is enforceable in that other Member State.15 Although not 
automatic, Article 41 states a judgment shall be declared enforceable 
immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53. Article 53 and 
54 essentially states that if the party seeking enforcement produces with the 
judgment a certificate that conforms to Annex V,16 then in that case the 
judgment is presumed enforceable.  
The judgment must be submitted to a specific court in the other Member 
State. Annex II to Brussels I list the appropriate courts for each Member 
State. Each Member State also retains the right to establish the procedure to 
be used when making an application for enforcement. The party against 
whom enforcement is sought is entitled to notice of the declaration of 
enforceability and there is a right of appeal on the enforceability decision.   
 
2. Two Illustrative Cases Arguing Non-Enforceability under Article 34  
 
As detailed above, in absence of the applicability of the aforementioned 
Article 34 defenses (and in some cases Article 35 defenses), pursuant to 
Articles 32 and 33, recognition is expected to be virtually automatic.17 That 
is, a judgment issued in a Member State is to be recognized in other 
Member State without the need for any proceeding in the courts of the 
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latter.18 Enforcement, on the other hand, as stated above, is granted only 
upon the satisfaction of the relatively simple19 exequatur proceedings 
described above.20  
The distinction between recognition and enforceability is, however, 
blurred when it comes to remedies available to a party against whom 
enforcement or recognition is sought.21 Firstly, both recognition and 
enforceability can be refused on the grounds listed in Articles 34 and 35 
only (articles which on the surface seem to deal with recognition only).22  
Secondly, the exclusive remedy for a violation of either Article 34 or 35 
provisions is an appeal of the declaration of enforceability, pursuant to 
Article 43.23 In essence, no Article 34 and 35 defenses/grounds can be 
raised by a defendant or the court, sua sponte, before (such as at recognition 
stage) or during the enforcement/ exequatur proceedings. Once the 
aforementioned Article 53 formalities are met, an enforcement declaration 
must be issued without review by any authority.  Review may only be had 
subsequently, by appeal pursuant to Article 43(1).24 The net effect of this is 
that the recognition and enforcement process becomes perfunctory; until a 
defendant appeals the declaration of enforceability, courts cannot scrutinize 
the judgment for which enforcement is sought to determine whether or not it 
ought to be recognized.  
In the end, all roads lead to the same place; both recognition and 
enforcement are contestable only by the same exclusive means (an appeal 
under Article 43) and only on the same grounds/defenses (Articles 34 and 
35).  Accordingly, further scrutiny of the procedural and substantive aspects 
of Articles 34 and 35 is warranted.25 However, given the broad coverage of 
these two Articles, this section of the article will limit its inquiry to two 
cases, both representative of the workings of the appeal remedy.  Both cases 
deal exclusively with Article 34(2), that is, non-recognition in cases of a 
default judgment for failure to appear.  
As stated above, Article 34(2) states that a judgment shall not be 
recognized “where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant 
was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with 
an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable 
him to arrange for his defense, unless the defendant failed to commence 
proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do 
so.”26 In general, Article 34(2) is intended to guarantee that the judgments 
admitted to free movement in the Member States have been issued in 
observance of the rights of the defendant.  Empirical evidence shows that, in 
practice, Article 34(2) is an often cited provision for objecting to the 
recognition / enforcement of a judgment.27    
The first of the two cases is ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor 
Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS), (C-283/05) [2006] E.C.R. I-12041.  In 
ASML, the European Court of Justice handed down a ruling on the 
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interpretation of Article 34(2). The procedural context of ASML is as 
follows:  ASML Netherlands BV (‘ASML’), a company established in the 
Netherlands, obtained a default judgment (for failure to appear) in a Dutch 
district court, against Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (‘SEMIS’), a 
company established in Austria. The judgment ordered SEMIS to pay 
ASML the sum of 219,918.60 Euros. However, notice of the default 
hearing was served to SEMIS only several days after the hearing, and the 
eventual default judgment was not served to SEMIS at all.   
ASML domesticated the judgment in Austria by applying for 
recognition and enforcement in an Austrian district court.28 The Austrian 
district court granted the enforceability application based on the 
certification of the Dutch district court. At such time, a copy of the 
enforcement order was caused to serve on SEMIS (the original default 
judgment was, again, not included in such service). SEMIS appealed the 
enforceability order to the regional court in Austria. The court found that 
enforceability could not be allowed since the judgment should have been 
served on the defendant to be “possible” for it to commence proceedings to 
challenge the judgment, within the meaning of Article 34(2). 
ASML appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court which referred the issue 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), based on the Article 34(2) 
exception.   As previously set forth, the general rule under Article 34(2) 
disallows recognition of a judgment when given in default of appearance if 
the defendant was not served with the document which commenced the 
proceeding in sufficient time and manner to allow defendant to defend 
himself. Article 34(2), however, also creates an exception to this rule, which 
allows recognition of a judgment even in absence of service described 
above, if the defendant failed to commence proceedings defend himself by 
challenging the judgment when it was “possible” for him to do so. ASML’s 
argument was based on this exception when it argued that although SEMI 
did not receive the notice of judgment, it had knowledge that the hearing 
occurred and that a judgment was issued, in part because, although 
untimely, SEMI had received notice of the hearing and proceeding.  
Consequently, according to ASML, it was “possible” for SEMI to challenge 
the judgment in the courts of the Member State where it was first issued.  
The ECJ, however, decided “that Article 34(2) of Brussels I No 44/2001 
is to be interpreted as meaning that it is ‘possible’ for a defendant to bring 
proceedings to challenge a default judgment against him only if he was in 
fact acquainted with its contents, because it was served on him in sufficient 
time to enable him to arrange for his defense before the courts of the State 
in which the judgment was given.”  In other words, knowledge of judgment 
alone is not sufficient, a judgment default most be properly served to the 
defendant so that he may become acquainted with its actual contents and 
remain in a position to defendant himself in a timely manner in the courts of 
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the Member State which issued  judgment. In essence, service of the 
judgment order is a second bite of the apple should the first bite (the service 
of document which commences proceedings) fail. The ASML decision is 
illustrative of Article 34(2) emphasis on the protection of the rights of the 
defense, which derive from the right to a fair legal process, requiring to 
begin with proper notice/ service of a complaint or a judgment order.  
The second illustrative case, Apostolides v Orams (C-420/07) [2009] 
E.C.R. I-3571 (ECJ (Grand Chamber)), is a landmark legal case for several 
reasons beyond the scope of this article.  The matter concerned the right for 
Greek Cypriot refugees to reclaim land in northern Cyprus, displaced after 
the 1974 Turkish invasion.  The case determined that although Cyprus does 
not exercise effective control in northern Cyprus, cases decided in its courts 
are applicable through European Union law.  The case, however, is also 
significant to Article 34(2) interpretation. The Apostilides (Greek-Cyprus 
nationals) sued the Orams (British nationals) in a Cyprus court, essentially 
seeking a return of their land. The documents commencing such 
proceedings were arguably defectively served upon the defendants, and 
consequently, the Omars failed to appear in the case in a timely manner.  
Unsurprisingly, the Apostilides prevailed and obtained a judgment based on 
the Omars’ lack of appearance. The Omars eventually learned of the 
judgment and applied to the same court to the have the judgment set aside.  
At such proceedings, the Omars argued that they were not properly served 
the documents which commenced the case.  The court was not convinced by 
their argument, accordingly, the Apostilides, again, prevailed and then 
sought and received a judgment enforcement order in the courts of England, 
pursuant to Article 43. The Orams appealed the enforcement order, pursuant 
to Article 44 to the English Court of Appeal which then referred the matter 
to the European Court of Justice.  
The question posed to the CJ was as follows: “the referring court asks 
essentially whether the recognition or enforcement of a default judgment 
may be refused under Article 34(2) of Brussels I No 44/2001 by reason of 
the fact that the defendant was not served with the document instituting the 
proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a 
way as to enable him to arrange for his defense, where he was able to 
commence proceedings to challenge that judgment before the courts of the 
Member State of origin.”29   
In the light of the foregoing, the CJ stated, “the answer to the fourth 
question is that the recognition or enforcement of a default judgment cannot 
be refused under Article 34(2) of Brussels I No 44/2001 where the 
defendant was able to commence proceedings to challenge the default 
judgment and those proceedings enabled him to argue that he had not been 
served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with the 
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equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him 
to arrange for his defense.” 
In essence, in this case the CJ found that the defendants were adequately 
protected even though Article 34(2)’s general rule requiring proper service 
of initial documents was not satisfied. The CJ found that the defendants was 
sufficiently protected under the aforementioned Article 34(2) exception; 
despite the lack of service, the fact that the defendants, in fact, challenged 
the default judgment demonstrated that it was “possible” for them to 
commence proceedings to challenge the judgment, within the meaning of 
Article 34(2). 
In the end, while the respective procedural histories of the Apostolides 
and ASML suggest a substantive inconsistency between the two cases, the 
suggestion is only superficial. In both matters the protection of the 
defendant is paramount to the CJ, and in both cases the CJ first and 
foremost ascertains whether the defendant is procedurally protected.  It may 
additionally argued that despite its strive to protect a defendant’s due 
process rights, the Apostolides case shows that the CJ will not choose form 
over substance.   
 
3. Brussels I and its Deficiencies 
 
Presently, the Commission to the Parliament and Council of EU is 
considering amending Brussels I.  The Commission has acknowledged that 
the Brussels I has worked well, however, after conducting empirical studies 
t a number of deficiencies arose.30 The Commission has pointed out that the 
goal of the revisions is “facilitating cross-border litigation and the free 
circulation of judgments in the European Union. The revision should also 
contribute to create the necessary legal environment for the European 
economy to recover.”31 The Commission has identified four major areas of 
concern.  
Firstly, the current procedure for the enforcement of judgments in 
another Member State (“exequatur”) remains an obstruction to the free 
circulation of judgments.  The process needs to be further streamlined so to 
eliminate unnecessary costs and delays which currently deter companies 
and citizens from making full use of the internal market.32 
Secondly, access to justice in the EU is overall unsatisfactory in disputes 
involving defendants from outside the EU. With some exceptions, the 
current Brussels I applies only when the defendant is domiciled inside the 
EU, and as a result, jurisdiction is governed by national law. The diversity 
of national law leads to unequal access to justice for EU companies in 
transactions with partners from third countries; some can easily litigate in 
the EU, others cannot.33   
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Thirdly, the efficiency of choice of forum agreements needs to be 
improved.  Currently, the Brussels I obliges the court designated by the 
parties in a choice of court agreement to stay proceedings if another court 
has been seized first.  This rule enables litigants acting in bad faith to delay 
the resolution of the dispute in the agreed forum by first seizing a non-
competent court.  This possibility creates additional costs and delays and 
undermines the legal certainty and predictability of dispute resolution which 
choice of court agreements should bring about.34   
Fourthly, the interface between arbitration and litigation needs to be 
improved. Arbitration is excluded from the scope of the Brussels I.  
However, by challenging an arbitration agreement before a court, a party 
may effectively undermine the arbitration agreement and create a situation 
of inefficient parallel court proceedings which may lead to irreconcilable 
resolutions of the dispute. This leads to additional cost and delays, 
undermines the predictability of dispute resolution and creates incentives 
for abusive litigation tactics.”35  
 
4. Brussels I and Current Proposals 
 
Numerous studies of the current Brussels I paradigm have been conducted.36 
Two studies examining different options for reform were conducted by 
external groups,37 and several conferences regarding such revision were co-
organized by the Commission in 2009.38 In the end, the Commission 
encouraged and sought out the opinions of several outside groups before 
moving forward with their final recommendations for revisions of Brussels 
I.   
 Several principal recommendations for revisions were put forth, the first 
of which is the proposed abolition of exequatur. As previously stated, 
“exequatur is a concept specific to the private international law and refers to 
the decision by a court authorizing the enforcement in that country of a 
judgment, arbitral award, authentic instruments or court settlement given 
abroad.”39 Under the current Brussels I, there are formalities that must be 
met before a foreign court recognizes and enforces a judgment from another 
jurisdiction. The proposed revisions would eliminate these formalities.  
More specifically, the change would eliminate the need for a “declaration of 
enforceability,” the documents discussed in the two cases in section II of 
this article. “The Member States has reached a degree of maturity which 
permits the move towards a simpler, less costly, and more automatic system 
of circulation of judgments, removing the existing formalities among 
Member States. The proposal therefore abolishes the exequatur procedure 
for all judgments covered by the scope of Brussels I with the exception of 
judgments in defamation and compensatory collective redress40 cases.”41     
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The second proposal strengthens the validity of choice of forum clauses.  
If private parties choose a particular court to hear a dispute resulting from 
an agreement, the parties’ choice must be recognized regardless of whether 
it is first or second seised.42 The proposal puts forth the rational that the 
strengthening choice of forum clauses will “eliminate the incentives for 
abusive litigation in non-competent courts.”43   
 Thirdly, the proposals seek to clearly recognize private parties’ choice 
of arbitration clauses. The proposed revision “…obliges a court seised of a 
dispute to stay proceedings if its jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an 
arbitration agreement and an arbitral tribunal has been seised of the case or 
court proceedings relating to the arbitration agreement have been 
commenced in the Member State of the seat of the arbitration. This 
modification will enhance the effectiveness of arbitration agreements in 
Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration proceedings, and eliminate the 
incentive for abusive litigation tactics”.44   
 Fourthly, the revision seeks to better coordinate the procedural rule of 
each Member States’ judiciary system, more specifically, procedural rules 
in matters dealing with lis pendens rules b requirement that consolidation 
has to be possible under national law. Concerning provisional, including 
protective measures, the proposal provides for the free circulation of those 
measures which have been granted by a court having jurisdiction on the 
substance of the case, including – subject to certain conditions – of 
measures which have been granted ex parte.45   
 The revisions also seek to increase access to justice, by for example, the 
creation of a forum for claims of rights in rem at the place where moveable 
assets are located and the possibility for employees to bring actions against 
multiple defendants in the employment area under Article 6(1). This 
possibility existed under the 1968 Brussels Brussels. Its reinsertion in the 
Brussels I will benefit employees who wish to bring proceedings against 
joint employers established in different Member States. Restoring the 
possibility to consolidate proceedings against several defendants in this 
context will mainly benefit employees.  The revisions also propose making 
mandatory information of a defendant entering an appearance about the 
legal consequences of not contesting the court’s jurisdiction.46 This last set 
of proposals appears to be technical in a sense and is aimed at the overall 
improvement of cross-border enforcement and jurisdictional issues.   
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion                     
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Despite some deficiencies, Brussels I 44/2001 has been acknowledged as a 
success. The Brussels I has provided businesses and individuals with the 
predictability and reliability necessary for effective dispute resolution across 
Member States’ borders. This clarity has, in turn, contributed to the 
promotion of the economic growth desired beginning with the 1968 
Brussels Brussels. A material aspect of this success has been the free 
movement of judgments. Brussels I 44/2001 has achieved free movement of 
judgments by greatly facilitating judgment recognition and judgment 
enforceability.   
      Presently, under the Brussels I, recognition is obtained without the need 
for any proceeding in the courts of the recognizing State, and enforcement 
is granted upon the satisfaction of relatively simple exequatur proceedings.  
Contemporaneously, as demonstrated by the ASML and Apostolides cases, 
the intended ease is balanced by the CJ’s strict scrutiny of any procedural 
defect which may undermine a defendant’s rights to due process.      
      Notwithstanding the Brussels I’s effectiveness, the EC is seeking to 
further improve the paradigm by considering the enactment of certain 
revisions. Several years since its enactment, empirical studies have 
suggested that some modifications would further improve the Brussels I’s 
temporal, monetary and procedural efficiency and result in greater 
uniformity of these same factors among the several Member States.  
      The provisions’ principal goal remains the same as that of back in 1968; 
the revisions are intended ameliorate the legal environment so to help 
improve the European economy. To help achieve this goal, among other 
things, the revisions would remove even the rudimentary exequatur 
proceedings presently required by the Brussels I. The revisions are also 
intended to create greater uniformity in access to justice by expanding the 
authority to resolve disputes involving parties from outside the EU.  Lastly, 
the revisions would also help avoid evident, unnecessary costs and (at times 
intentionally created) delays, by strengthening / establishing recognition of 
choice of forum agreements and arbitration agreements.     
      In the end, as examined above, the proposed changes should add to the 
fluidity of the free movement of judgments achieved by the present Brussels 
I. And consequently, lead to greater commercial interaction between the 
nationals of the Member States and the ensuing economic growth.          
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may entail uncertainties in the Member States. In the present state of affairs, 
however, the ECJ has elaborated the basic structures of the Community concept, 
while its application in relation to the different enforceable instruments of the 
Member States is a matter for the national courts.” B. Hess/T. Pfeiffer/P. Schlosser, 
Report on the Application of Brussels I Brussels I in the Member States (Study 
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also referred to as the Heidelberg Report), para. 1) demonstrates that Member States 
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obtains a decision on enforceability within less than two weeks all necessary 
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